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ABSTRACT 
As information sharing becomes increasingly necessary 
for mission accomplishment within the Department of 
Defense, the rules for protecting information have 
tightened.  The sustained and rapid advancement of 
information technology in the 21st century dictates the 
adoption of a flexible and adaptable cryptographic strategy 
for protecting national security information.  RSA 
techniques, while formidable, have begun to present 
vulnerabilities to the raw computing power that is 
commercially available today.   
This thesis is a comprehensive characterization of the 
current state of the art in DoD encryption standards.  It 
will emphasize the mathematical algorithms that facilitate 
legacy encryption and its proposed NSA Suite B 
replacements.  We will look at how the new technology 
addresses the latest threats and vulnerabilities that 
legacy methods do not fully mitigate.  It will then 
summarize the findings of the security capabilities of NSA 
Suite B standards as compared to the costs in manpower and 
money to implement them, and suggest how to best utilize 
NSA Suite B technology for the purpose of providing 
confidentiality, integrity and availability in an 
environment with real world threats.     
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MOTIVATION FOR THESIS 
In August 2007, the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) issued the SP 800-78-1 publication on 
Information Security.  SP 800-78-1 specifies the timeline 
for mandatory Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) cryptographic 
key and hash migration for the next several years. This 
standard stipulates the implementation deadlines for 
several Personal Identification Verification (PIV) related 
cryptographic changes such as new algorithms and larger key 
and hash sizes.  Each cryptographic change in Common Access 
Card (CAC) and Certificate Authority (CA) key size, key 
algorithms, and hash size has the potential to push 
issuance and usage times beyond acceptable limits for the 
average Department of Defense (DoD) user.   
This thesis will determine some of the potential 
impact of this migration on CAC usage.  It will describe 
findings obtained through lab testing of CAC cards using 
old and new encryption techniques and will assess some of 
the risk associated with a DoD-wide migration to RSA 2048 
with SHA-1 keys and eventually to NSA Suite B.  Migration 
risk will be analyzed and quantified using a critical path 
analysis technique. 
The motivation for this research is to help identify 
to the federal community some prudent testing and some 
potentially important milestones for each of the proposed 
cryptographic changes.  In order to do this we will focus 
on issues of performance and risk management.  
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B. CURRENT STATE OF DOD CAC METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
The Department of Defense has approximately four 
million CAC cards in active circulation.  Use of these 
cards is mandatory for PKI, DoD-wide interoperable access 
to systems, and physical access to government intranet 
sites.  The degrees of freedom in this PKI system are very 
low, and any disruptions are likely to have significant and 
potentially long lasting repercussions.  Hence, a change in 
any part of the CAC system must be tested carefully and 
meticulously prior to entering final production.  SP 800-
78-1 specifies a number of cryptographic enhancements and 
the time line for their implementation.  These include a 
substantial increase in RSA key size from 1024 to 2048 
bits, transition from SHA 1 to SHA 256, continuation of the 
use of the AES symmetric algorithm and eventually 
transition to components of NSA Suite B. 
C. SCOPE 
The CAC testing procedures assume proper functionality 
of all tested algorithms and so focus instead on 
performance, although observation of both aspects will 
occur in this thesis.  Testing is divided into two parts.  
Part one is a comparison of 1024- and 2048-bit RSA key 
generation and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) authentication.  
Part two compares the same metrics for RSA 1024 as they 
match up against ECC 256.     
The recommended testing is not meant to be exhaustive 
but rather to indicate possible performance constraints.  
The DoD PIV End Point CAC performs three RSA key 
generations inside of the smart card for total security 
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assurance.  This paper includes detailed statistical 
information on the difference between the 1024-bit keys and 
2048-bit keys.   
D. ENCRYPTION TAXONOMY 
The modern field of cryptography includes 
authentication, integrity, confidentiality and non-
repudiation of information.  Some older cryptographic 
methods rely on the secrecy of their encryption algorithms.  
Most modern algorithms base their security on the security 
of keys rather than the secrecy of the method.  Most modern 
techniques fall into one of two types: symmetric and 
asymmetric.  
Symmetric key cryptography uses a single key for both 
encryption and decryption.  With symmetric key 
cryptography, the key must be known to both the sender and 
the receiver.  The most significant challenge to this 
method then becomes the distribution and management of 
these keys.  If there are 100 people who need to 
communicate with one another, each one of them needs to 
share a common secret key with the other 99.  The 
implication of this is that all 100 people have to keep all 
keys safe, which creates a challenging security situation. 
Asymmetric key cryptography, or public key 
cryptography, came about in part to address the key 
management issues created by use of symmetric key 
cryptography.  Instead of a single, secret key for each 
pair of users, asymmetric key cryptography requires a 
private and a public key for each participating user.  The 
public key, which is used for the encryption of the 
message, is freely distributable.  The private key is used 
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only to decrypt the message.  Since the private key cannot 
be computed based solely on the knowledge of the public 
key, the system remains secure even though the public key 
is freely available.  In this scenario, every user needs 
only keep his or her private key confidential.  An added 
benefit of this method is that it facilitates a method for 
generating digital signatures for authentication and non-
repudiation. 
Symmetric algorithms are generally much faster to 
execute than asymmetric.  However, asymmetric algorithms 
are roughly 100 to 1,000 times more difficult to break 
depending on the algorithm (De Clercq, 2006).  In broad 
security practice, symmetric and asymmetric algorithms are 
used together so that an asymmetric key algorithm can be 
used to exchange a randomly generated symmetric key.  The 
generated symmetric key can then be used to encrypt the 
actual message using a symmetric algorithm.  Following from 
this idea, asymmetric ciphers are typically used for data 
authentication through digital signatures, for the 
distribution of a symmetric bulk encryption key, for non-
repudiation services, and for key agreement.  Symmetric 
ciphers support the secure exchange of information 
synergistically with asymmetric algorithms by bulk 
encrypting the actual data.   
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II. RIVEST SHAMIR ADLEMAN (RSA) ALGORITHM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. History of RSA Algorithm Based Encryption 
The RSA algorithm, initially published in the paper “A 
Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key 
Cryptosystems” in 1977 is the product of the combined 
efforts of Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman.  Named 
after the first initials of the MIT researchers last names, 
the RSA algorithm can be used for both public key 
encryption and digital signatures.  Its security is based 
on the difficulty of factoring large prime integers.  RSAs 
breakthrough became widely publicized by Martin Gardner in 
August 1977, in his column “Mathematical Games” in 
Scientific American  magazine.  At the time, the authors 
offered to send their full report to anyone who sent them a 
self-addressed stamped envelope.  In spite of attempts by 
the NSA to stop the international distribution of the RSA 
source code it continued due to lack of a legal basis for 
the NSAs request.  A more detailed version was subsequently 
published in the February 1978 edition of The 
Communications of the ACM  thereby rendering all protests 
moot.  Regardless, the legal battle with the U.S. 
Government over the RSA algorithm went on for several 
years. Finally, in 1982, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman formed 
the company “RSA” to market their Public Key Cryptography 
(PKC) algorithm as an electronic security product.  They 
obtained a patent on the RSA algorithm in the U.S. only.  
They could not obtain an international patent because they 
had already published their ideas globally and most 
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countries bar retroactive patenting of open source 
concepts.  In September 2000, the U.S. patent for the RSA 
algorithm expired, enabling software developers everywhere 
to freely include this PKC standard in their products 
(Stewart, 2009).   
Whether as a licensed product, (e.g., part of Pretty 
Good Privacy), or implemented for private use, the RSA 
algorithm has become the foundation of an entire generation 
of public key cryptography security products.  It provides 
secure communications between parties separated by distance 
that may have never met.  RSA provides the ideal mechanism 
required for private communications over distributed 
electronic networks, and forms the basis of almost all the 
security products now in use on the Internet for financial 
and other private communications, including most enterprise 
level Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) systems, like that 
operated by the Department of Defense. 
B. UNDERLYING CONCEPTS AND TECHNOLOGY 
1. Key Generation 
In order to generate the necessary keys to support RSA 
cryptographic operations, the following algorithm is 
required.  Two large, random prime numbers must be 
generated, p and q, of approximately equal size such that 
their product, n, is of the required bit length.  The size 
of an RSA key refers to the bit-length of the RSA modulus. 
This should not be confused with the actual number of bits 
required to store an RSA public key, which may be slightly 
more (Lenstra & Verheul, p. 8).  The topic of key lengths 
and their associated strengths will be looked at in Chapter 
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III of this thesis, but in general the larger the prime 
numbers, the stronger the generated key. 
Next, compute n = pq and compute φ = (p-1)(q-1). The 
value of n is known as the modulus.  The value of phi is 
the lower limit of the boundary in which the set of numbers 
that are co-prime to n is contained.  The upper limit is n 
itself. 
Third, choose an integer e such that 1 < e < φ, and 
such that the greatest common divisor (gcd) of e and φ is 
1.  The value chosen for e is known as the public exponent 
or encryption exponent or just simply the exponent. 
Finally, Compute the secret exponent d, 1 < d < φ, 
such that (e)(d) ≡ 1 (mod φ).  In order to compute the 
value for d, the Extended Euclidean Algorithm must be used 
to calculate d = e-1 (mod φ).  The Extended Euclidean 
Algorithm is used in mathematics for finding the gcd of any 
two integers.  The computed d value is known as the secret 
exponent or decryption exponent.  
The public key now becomes (n, e) and the private key, 
(n, d).  All the values d, p, q and φ must be kept secret.  
In practice, common choices for e are 3, 17 and 65537 
(216+1). These are Fermat primes, sometimes referred to as 
F0, F2 and F4 respectively.  The formula used to derive 
numbers from the Fermat sequence is F(x)=2^(2^x)+1).  They 
are chosen because they make the modular exponentiation 
operation faster.  Also, having chosen e, it is simpler to 
test whether gcd(e, p-1)=1 and gcd(e, q-1)=1 while 
generating and testing the primes in the first step.  
Values of p or q that fail this test can be rejected  
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without further consideration.  Once keys have been 
generated, encryption and decryption becomes a relatively 
simple mathematical process. 
2. Encryption 
Once a key of appropriate length has been generated it 
next falls to the process of encrypting the plaintext 
message.  In order to encrypt, the sender must do the 
following: 
1.  Obtain the recipients public key. 
2. Represent the plaintext message as a positive 
integer m. 
3.  Compute the cipher-text c = me (mod n). 
4.  Send the cipher-text c to the recipient.  
3. Decryption 
In order to decrypt the message, the recipient must do 
the following: 
   1.   Use their private key to compute m = cd (mod n).  
   2. Extract the plaintext from the message 
representative m.  
4. Key Management 
Anyone who wishes to sign a message or decrypt an 
encrypted message must have a key pair.  It is common to 
use separate key pairs for signing messages and encrypting 
messages.  Additionally, a user could have a key pair 
affiliated with his or her work and a separate key pair for 
personal use.  Other entities may also have key pairs, 
including electronic devices such as modems, workstations, 
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Web servers (Web sites) and printers, as well as 
organizational entities such as a corporate department, a 
hotel registration desk, or a university registrars office.  
Key pairs allow people and other entities to authenticate 
and encrypt messages. (RSA Security, 2000, p. 4.1.1) 
A user can generate his or her own key pair, or, 
depending on local policy, a security officer may generate 
key pairs for all users.  There are tradeoffs between the 
two approaches.  In the former, the user needs some way to 
trust his or her copy of the key generation software, and 
in the latter, the user must trust the security officer and 
the private key must be transferred securely to the user.  
Typically, each node on a network would be capable of local 
key generation. 
Once a key has been generated, the user must register 
his or her public key with some central administration, 
called a Certification Authority.  The CA returns to the 
user a certificate attesting to the “binding” of the users 
public key to certain user attributes; the users unique 
name/identity being one typical attribute.  If a security 
officer generates the key pair, then the security officer 
can request the certification of the public key on behalf 
of the user.  
As with all keys, distribution is important to 
security.  Key distribution must be secured against 
observation (unauthorized disclosure), modification (a loss 
of integrity) and impersonation (a loss of authenticity).  
If an attacker has a way to give a legitimate user an 
arbitrary key that will make him believe it belongs to 
another legitimate user, and the attacker can intercept 
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transmissions between two legitimate users, then they can 
send their own public key (which is believed to belong to a 
legitimate user) and intercept any real cipher-text sent. 
Once intercepted the encrypted message can be decrypted 
with the attackers own private key, a copy of the message 
can be saved, the message can be re-encrypted with a 
legitimate public key, and the new cipher-text can be sent 
to the intended legitimate recipient.  In principle, 
neither legitimate user would be able to detect the 
activities of the attacker.  Defenses against such attacks 
are often based on digital certificates or other components 
of a public key infrastructure. 
C. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 
Factoring an RSA-modulus, n, by exhaustive search 
amounts to trying all primes up to the product of p and n.  
Finding a discrete logarithm by exhaustive search requires 
on the order of p operations in a finite field of numbers 
as large as p itself.  If exhaustive search were the best 
attack on these systems, then bit length could be 
relatively small with an acceptable level of security.  
However, there are much more efficient and creative attacks 
available to attackers.  Such attacks can only be defeated 
by the use of much larger keys, which will help to maintain 
acceptable security.  The most efficient factoring 
algorithm published to date is the Number Field Sieve, 
invented in 1988 by John Pollard.  Originally, it could be 
used only to factor numbers of a special form, such as the 
ninth Fermat number 2512 + 1.  This original version is 
currently referred to as the Special Number Field Sieve 
(SNFS), as opposed to the General Number Field Sieve 
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(GNFS), which can handle numbers of arbitrary form, 
including RSA moduli.  Heuristically the GNFS can be 
expected to require time proportional to 
           e(1.9229+o(1)) ln(n)1/3ln(ln(n))2/3 
to factor an RSA modulus n, where the o(1) term goes to 
zero as n goes to infinity.  (Lenstra & Verheul, p.9-10) 
1. RSA Integer Factorization 
As previously stated, the RSA factoring problem is the 
task of taking eth roots modulo a composite n: recovering a 
value m such that c = memod n, where (n,e) is an RSA public 
key and c is an RSA encrypted message.  The simplest and 
most direct approach to solving the RSA problem is to 
factor the modulus.  With the ability to recover its prime 
factors, an attacker can compute the secret exponent d from 
a public key (n,e), then decrypt c using the standard 
procedure.  To accomplish this, an attacker factors n into 
p and q, and computes (p − 1)(q − 1), which then allows d 
to be determined from e.  No set number of computational 
steps for factoring large integers on a classical computer 
has yet been found, however the absence of evidence is not 
definitive evidence of absence.  It has not been proven 
that no polynomial-time method exists to solve the 
algorithm, outright.  
As of 2008, the largest number factored by a general-
purpose factoring algorithm was 663 bits long (RSA-200), 
using a state-of-the-art distributed implementation.  The 
next largest number is probably going to be a 768-bit 
modulus according to Peter Montgomery in his October 2008 
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publication on Preliminary Design of Post-Sieving 
Processing for RSA-768. (Montgomery, 2008) 
NIST recommends RSA keys to be at least 1,024 bits 
with a near term increase to 2048 bits long.  With 
increased computing power now commercially available, 
1,024-bit keys may become breakable in the foreseeable 
future, and will be considered insufficiently secure in the 
year 2010.  
As previously stated, the strength of RSA encryption 
is based on key size.  The bigger the key, the better 
security it provides.  If the key length, n, is 300 or 
fewer bits, it can be factored in a few hours on a personal 
computer with average processing capability, using software 
already freely available.  In 1999, keys of 512-bit length 
were shown to be breakable when RSA-155 was factored by 
using several hundred computers.  Since that time, 512-bit 
length keys have been demonstrated to be vulnerable to 
factoring using commonly available hardware in as little 
time as a few weeks. (Fivemack, 2007)  
2. Timing Attacks   
In 1995, President and Chief Scientist of Cryptography 
Research Inc., Paul Kocher, described a new way to attack 
the RSA algorithm.  If an attacker knows the legitimate 
users hardware in sufficient detail and is able to measure 
the decryption times for several known cipher-texts, he can 
deduce the decryption key quickly.  This attack can be 
applied against the RSA signature scheme as well.  In 2003, 
a more practical attack capable of recovering RSA 
factorizations over a network connection (e.g., from a SSL-
enabled Web server) was found. This attack took advantage 
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of a weakness in the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) 
optimization used by many RSA implementations. 
One way to defeat timing attacks is to ensure that the 
decryption operation takes a constant amount of time for 
every key.  However, this approach can significantly reduce 
performance.  Instead, most RSA implementations use an 
alternate technique known as cryptographic blinding.  
Blinding makes use of the multiplicative property of RSA.  
Instead of computing cdmod n, the legitimate user first 
chooses a secret random value r and computes (rec)dmod n. 
The result of this computation is rm(mod n) and so the 
effect of r can be removed by multiplying by its inverse. A 
new value of r is chosen for each cipher-text.  With 
blinding applied, the decryption time is no longer 
correlated to the value of the input cipher-text and so the 
timing attack fails (Kocher, n.d.). 
3. Chosen Cipher-text Attacks 
A chosen cipher-text attack (CCA) is an attack model 
in which the cryptanalyst gathers information by choosing a 
cipher-text and decrypting it without previously knowing 
the key. 
A number of seemingly secure schemes can be defeated 
by chosen cipher-text attacks.  Early versions of RSA 
padding (padding will be addressed in more depth later in 
this chapter) used in the SSL protocol were vulnerable to a 
particular adaptive chosen cipher-text attack, which 
revealed SSL session keys.  Due to flaws within the padding 
scheme, a practical attack against RSA implementations of 
the SSL protocol was found.  As a result, cryptographers 
now recommend the use of provably secure padding schemes 
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such as Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding.  
Additionally, RSA Laboratories has released new versions 
that are not vulnerable to chosen cipher-text attacks. 
(Cramer & Shoup, 1998) 
CCAs have implications for designers of tamper-
resistant cryptographic smart cards as well.  They must be 
particularly cognizant of the CCA threat, as these cards 
could conceivably fall into the hands of an unauthorized 
user, who might then issue a large number of chosen cipher-
texts in an attempt to recover the hidden secret key. 
When a cryptosystem is vulnerable to chosen cipher-
text attacks, its implementers must be careful to avoid 
situations in which an attacker might be able to decrypt 
chosen cipher-texts.  Specifically, the explicit 
requirement of a message integrity checker and the use of 
some form of message compression will offer protection 
against chosen cipher-text attacks. (Jallad, Katz & 
Schneier, 2003, p.12) 
Chosen cipher-text attacks may be adaptive or non-
adaptive. In a non-adaptive attack, the attacker chooses 
the cipher-text to be decrypted in advance, and does not 
use the resulting plain-text message to influence their 
next cipher-text target.  In an adaptively chosen cipher-
text attack, the attacker makes their target message choice 
adaptively, that is, the message to be decrypted is chosen 
based on the results of all prior decryptions. (Cramer & 
Shoup, 1998) 
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4. Branch Prediction Analysis Attacks 
Branch prediction analysis, also called BPA, uses a 
branch predictor to determine whether a conditional branch 
in the instruction flow of a program is likely to be taken.  
Typical branch prediction analysis attacks use a spy 
process to statistically discover a private key when it is 
used to encrypt data.  A more refined form of BPS known as 
Simple Branch Prediction Analysis (SBPA) claims to improve 
BPA in a way that is less calculation intensive but far 
more insidious and efficient. (Aciicmez, Koc & Seiffert, 
2007)  
While BPA attacks resemble timing attacks, where an 
attacker uses many execution-time measurements under the 
same key in order to statistically amplify some small but 
key dependent timing differences, SBPA dramatically 
improves upon standard BPA results.  Using a spy process 
that runs simultaneously with an RSA-process, collection of 
almost all the secret key bits is possible during an RSA 
signing execution.  Using SBPA 508 out of 512 bits of an 
RSA key were correctly identified in as few as 10 
iterations.  (Aciicmez, Koc & Seiffert, 2007) 
In effect, SBPA is the process of analyzing a CPUs 
Branch Predictor states by spying on a single computation 
process.  This one distinction provides a sharp contrast 
from those attacks relying on statistical methods and 
requiring many computation measurements under the same key.  
The successful extraction of almost all secret key bits by 
an SBPA attack against an Open SSL RSA implementation 
demonstrates that the often recommended blinding techniques 
to protect RSA against side-channel attacks are not, in and 
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of themselves, enough to ensure adequate protection of 
sensitive information.  (Aciicmez, Koc & Seiffert, 2007) 
5. Padding Schemes 
Practical RSA implementations typically embed some 
form of structured, randomized padding into the value m 
before encrypting it. This padding ensures that m does not 
fall into the range of insecure plaintexts, and that a 
given message, once padded, will encrypt to one of a large 
number of different possible cipher texts. 
Standards such as PKCS#1 have been designed to 
securely pad messages prior to RSA encryption.  These 
standards pad the plaintext, m, with some number of 
additional bits, the size of the padded message will always 
be larger than the original message.  RSA padding schemes 
must be carefully designed to prevent attacks, which could 
capitalize on a predictable message structure.  At a 
minimum they should perform two basic tasks.  The first is 
to add an element of randomness that can be used to convert 
a deterministic encryption scheme (e.g., always produces 
the same cipher-text for a given plaintext and key, even 
over separate executions of the encryption algorithm) into 
a probabilistic scheme.  The second is to prevent partial 
message decryption by ensuring that an adversary is unable 
to recover any portion of the plaintext without being able 
to backwards compute the one way function.  Early versions 
of the PKCS#1 standard used a construction that seemed to 
enhance RSA as a secure encryption scheme.  This version 
was later found vulnerable to an adaptive chosen cipher-
text attack.  Later versions of the standard, which include 
Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP), prevented 
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such attacks.  The PKCS#1 standard also incorporates 
processing schemes designed to provide additional security 
for RSA signatures, for example, the Probabilistic 
Signature Scheme for RSA (RSA-PSS). 
D. CURRENT STATE OF THE ART 
1. How are RSA Encryption Techniques Being Used 
Today? 
Since the DoD first implemented smart card technology 
based on CAC specifications, the Common Access Card has 
served as the standard ID card for millions of active duty 
military personnel, reservists, DoD civilian employees and 
contractors.  The CAC is becoming the principal card used 
to enable physical access to buildings and controlled 
spaces, and is also being used to support applications such 
as manifesting, food service and medical and dental.  It is 
also being used to control logical access to DoD computer 
networks and systems.  An individuals CAC card contains 
their private key to be used for secure authentication to 
computer systems operating within a given public key 
infrastructure.  
According to the DoDs Access Card Office, the ultimate 
goal of the CAC program is to create an “any card, any 
reader, any vendor” smart card environment.   
Using RSA type encryption, CAC software combines the 
security of smart cards with the strength of digital 
certificates used for accessing networks, applications and 
data.  These cards have enabled the DoD to migrate from 
passwords to digital certificates and finally to 
comprehensive PKI and single sign-on implementations. 
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RSA SecurID Passage smart card software, the platform 
on which CAC is established, is a standards-based smart 
card authentication program that ensures flexibility and 
information protection.  It supports critical industry 
standards including X.509 v3 certificates, PKCS #5, #11 and 
#12, CAPI, SSL and qualified PC/SC readers. (“RSA Security 
Announces,” 2001) 
2. RSA Encryption and Key Management Suite 
The RSA Encryption and Key Management Suite is an 
integrated suite of products that protect information at 
every layer of the OSI model while reducing complexity 
associated with point encryption key management techniques.  
Using many of the techniques discussed earlier in this 
chapter, RSA can minimize the risk associated with data 
breaches of sensitive information, intellectual property, 
and strategic and operational data.  It can meet encryption 
requirements for data at rest and data in transit.  It 
protects sensitive information stored in file systems on 
servers and endpoints, while also securely storing, 
distributing and managing encryption keys throughout their 
life cycle.  Finally, this suite allows secure application 
design between elements of the DoD and private industry 
without incurring additional costs or further extending 
timelines. (“RSA Encryption and Key Management,” 2009) 
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III. NSA SUITE B 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Background of NSA Suite B 
The NSA Central Security Service states that, “the 
sustained and rapid advance of information technology in 
the 21st century dictates the adoption of a flexible and 
adaptable cryptographic strategy for protecting national 
security information.”  The NSA announced Suite B at the 
2005 RSA Conference as a response to this requirement.  
Suite B will complement the existing policy for the use of 
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) that protects 
national security systems and information.  Suite B 
includes cryptographic algorithms for hashing, digital 
signatures, and key exchange.  
NSA Suite B is a subset of the cryptographic 
algorithms approved by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) and as such is suitable for use 
throughout DoD and all other governmental agencies.  The 
entire suite of cryptographic algorithms is intended to 
protect both classified and unclassified national security 
systems and information.  Beyond just the governmental 
applications, NSA Suite B will also provide industry with a 
common set of cryptographic algorithms that they can use to 
create products that meet the procurement needs of the U.S. 
Government. (National Security Agency Central Security 
Service, 2009) 
When analyzing Suite B it is important to distinguish 
what it is and what it is not.  Suite B only specifies the 
cryptographic algorithms to be used.  There are many other 
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competing factors that determine whether a particular 
device that implements a set of cryptographic algorithms 
should be used to satisfy a given security requirement.  
The quality of the implementation of the cryptographic 
algorithm in software, firmware, or hardware must be 
sufficient.  Operational requirements associated with DoD 
approved key and key management activities must be 
commensurate.  Another point for consideration is the 
sensitivity or other access restrictions of the information 
to be protected (e.g., SECRET, TOP SECRET, NOFORN, FOUO, 
etc.).  Finally, the operational requirements for 
interagency and international interoperability will always 
be a factor.  The processes by which these factors are 
addressed are outside the scope of cryptographic 
technology.  The primary focus of Suite B is simply 
protecting the information. (National Security Agency 
Central Security Service, 2009) 
B. UNDERLYING CONCEPTS AND TECHNOLOGY 
1. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
Over the past three decades Internet communications 
have been secured by the earliest generations of public key 
cryptographic algorithms, most of which were developed in 
the middle to late 1970s.  They have formed the basis for 
key management and authentication, Web traffic and secure 
e-mail.  These public key techniques revolutionized 
cryptography as it had been used and understood; however, 
newer techniques have been developed that offer better 
performance and increased security.  Specifically, Elliptic 
Curve (EC) techniques, which were independently created by 
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Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller, offer an exciting way ahead 
for the science of cryptography. 
In a recent posting on the NSA website, they state 
that, “the best assured group of new public key techniques 
is built on the arithmetic of elliptic curves.  While 
currently elliptic curves do not offer many noticeably 
significant benefits over existing public key algorithms, 
over time the evolving threat posed by eavesdroppers and 
hackers with access to greater computing resources will 
demonstrate what elliptic curves can offer.”  In general, 
current PKI methods respond to new attacks by relying on, 
and when necessary dramatically increasing, their key 
sizes.  Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) allows for better 
security with a significant reduction in key size.  
Moreover, “ECC has to date exhibited no vulnerabilities to 
increasingly strong attack algorithms, but has remained 
secure with little required adaptation” (National Security 
Agency Central Security Service, 2009). 
Presently, the methods for computing elliptical curve 
mathmematics are much less efficient than those for 
factoring or computing integer factorization schemes (such 
as the ones used in RSA encryption).  As a result, shorter 
key sizes can be used to achieve comparable security to 
conventional public-key cryptosystems. (Lenstra & Verheul, 
2000) This, in turn, has the potential to lead to less 
memory requirement and improved performance vis-à-vis 
smaller keys and faster computations.  These advantages are 
especially important in environments where processing 
power, storage space, bandwidth, or power consumption is 
constrained. 
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a. ECC Key Generation  
A generic Elliptic Curve (EC) system consists of 
a public key of a finite field GF(p) of size p, a generator 
g of the multiplicative group GF(p), and an element y of 
GF(p) that is not equal to 1.  In an EC system, g generates 
a subgroup, q, of the group of points on an elliptic curve, 
E, over the finite field GF(p).  The security is based on 
the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in the 
subgroup generated by g.  These subgroup logarithms can be 
computed only if all the discrete logarithms in the full 
group of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field 
can be computed.  This computational procedure is known as 
the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm (ECDL) problem.  
There is currently no better method to solve the ECDL 
problem other than to solve the problem in all cyclic 
subgroups and then combine the results.  The difficulty of 
the ECDL problem depends on the size of the largest prime 
divisor of the order of the group of points of the curve, 
which is close to p.  For this reason, p, E, and q are 
usually chosen such that the sizes of p and q are close.  
The security of EC systems, then, relies on the size of q.  
The size of an EC key refers to the bit-length of the 
subgroup size q.  The actual number of bits required to 
store an EC public key could conceivably be substantially 
larger than the EC key size q, since the public key 
contains p, E, g, and y as well. (Lenstra & Verheul, 2000) 
ECC systems use two kinds of curves.  The first 
kind, Pseudo-random curves, are those whose coefficients 
are generated from the output of a seeded cryptographic 
hash. If the seed value is given along with the 
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coefficients, it can be verified that the coefficients were 
generated by that method.  The second kind, Special curves, 
are those whose coefficients and underlying field have been 
specifically selected to optimize the efficiency of the 
elliptic curve operations.  (U.S. Dept of Commerce, 2000, 
p. 29) 
b. Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
Fundamentally a digital signature is simply the 
digital version of a handwritten signature that is used 
every day to demonstrate that whatever was signed was done 
by one and only one person.  A digital signature is 
represented in a computer as a string of binary digits that 
are dependent on the signers private key, as well as the 
contents of the message.  A digital signature is computed 
using a set of rules and a set of parameters such that the 
identity of the signatory and integrity of the data can be 
verified.  An algorithm provides the capability to generate 
and verify the signatures.  Signature generation makes use 
of a private key to encrypt a hash of the data being 
signed.  An adversary, who does not know the private key of 
the signatory, cannot generate the correct signature of the 
signatory.  More plainly stated; signatures cannot be 
forged.  Signature verification makes use of a public key, 
which corresponds to, but is not the same as, the private 
key.  By using the signatorys public key, anyone can verify 
a correctly signed message.  A means of associating public 
and private key pairs to the corresponding users is 
required.  That is, there must be a binding of a users 
identity and the users public key. This binding may be 
certified by a mutually trusted and unbiased third party.  
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Possible disputes that could arise will do so either when a 
signer tries to deny a signature they legitimately created, 
or when a forger makes a fraudulent claim.  For both 
signature generation and verification, the data, which is 
referred to as a message, is reduced by means of the Secure 
Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) as specified in the Federal 
Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 180-2.     
Digital signatures can be used to provide basic 
cryptographic services such as data integrity, which 
assures that data has not been altered by unauthorized 
means, data authentication that assures that the source of 
data is as claimed and finally, non-repudiation, which 
assures that an entity cannot deny previously sent 
transmissions. (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000) 
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
(ECDSA) is the elliptic curve flavor of the Digital 
Signature Algorithm used in legacy cryptosystems.  ECDSA 
was first proposed in 1992 by Scott Vanstone in response to 
the NISTs request for public comments on their first 
proposal for a Digital Signature Standard (Vanstone, 1992).  
It was accepted in 1998 as an ISO (International Standards 
Organization) standard (ISO 14888-3), and subsequently in 
1999 as an ANSI (American National Standards Institute) 
standard (ANSI X9.62).  Finally, in 2000 it was accepted as 
an IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) 
(IEEE 1363-2000) and a FIPS standard (FIPS 186-2). (Johnson 
& Menezes & Vanstone, 2001) 
An ECDSA key pair (public and private) is 
associated with a particular elliptic curve.  The public 
key is a random multiple of the base point, while the 
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private key is the integer used to generate the multiple.  
In other words, given two points G and Y on an elliptic 
curve such that Y = kG, k is the private key and Y is the 
public key. Finding k is another example of the ECDL 
problem.   
A large part of the digital signature process 
involves legitimizing the key pairs used. Proving ownership 
and validity greatly increases the quality of the assurance 
of the signature.  Public key validation ensures that a 
public key has the requisite mathematical properties.  
Successful execution of the validation process demonstrates 
that an associated private key logically exists, although 
it does not demonstrate that someone actually has computed 
the private key.  More importantly, it does not demonstrate 
that the claimed owner actually possesses the private key.  
Practical reasons for performing public key validation 
include both prevention of malicious insertion of an 
invalid public key and detection of inadvertent coding or 
transmission errors. (Johnson & Menezes & Vanstone, 2001)  
In order to prevent an entity from claiming a 
fraudulent public key, the CA should require all entities 
to prove possession of the private keys corresponding to 
its public keys before the CA certifies the public key.  
This proof of possession can be accomplished in a variety 
of ways.  One such method is to require all entities to 
sign a message of the CAs choice.  The other is by using 
“zero-knowledge” techniques.  It is noteworthy to highlight 
the fact that proof of possession of a private key provides 
different assurances from public key validation. The former 
demonstrates possession of a private key even though it may 
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correspond to an invalid public key, while the latter 
demonstrates validity of a public key but not ownership of 
the corresponding private key.  Doing both provides a 
higher level of assurance regarding digital signatures. 
c. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement 
The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman scheme is a key 
agreement scheme based on ECC.  It is designed to provide 
either unilateral or mutual key authentication, known-key 
security, and forward secrecy.  It does this under the 
assumption that issues involving authenticated public key 
exchange and key pairs’ states (ephemeral vs. static) have 
been resolved in accordance with NIST recommendations 
(Certicom Research, 2000). 
Secret cryptographic keying material may be 
electronically established between parties by using either 
a key agreement scheme or a key transport scheme.  During 
key agreement both parties contribute to the shared secret 
and by extension the derived secret keying material.  The 
secret keying material to be established is therefore never 
sent directly to one person or the other.  Instead, 
information is exchanged between both parties that then 
allows each to derive the secret keying material.   
An alternative option to the key agreement method 
described above is the use of an asymmetric key based key 
transport scheme.  During key transport one party selects 
the secret keying material.  The encrypted or “wrapped” 
secret keying material is transported from the sender to 
the receiver. (Barker & Johnson & Smid, 2007) 
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The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman technique 
examined here generates a field element from a secret key 
owned by one entity and a public key owned by a second 
entity in such a way that when both execute the key 
exchange technique with corresponding keys as input, they 
will compute the same field element.  The primary security 
requirement is that an attacker who sees only one entity or 
the others public key should be unable to compute the 
shared field element.   
The requirement that an attacker be unable to 
derive the shared field element is a direct result of the 
requirement that the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman problem 
(ECDHP) be sufficiently difficult to solve.  The ECDHP is 
closely related to the ECDLP mentioned earlier.  If the 
ECDLP is easy then the ECDHP is also.  The converse is also 
true (Boneh & Lipton, 1996).  Many key agreement schemes 
based on Diffie-Hellman actually rely on the stronger 
requirement that the shared field element is not just 
sufficiently difficult for an attacker to predict, but that 
the element actually looks random to the attacker. 
(Certicom Research, 2000) 
For key exchange, NSA Suite B calls for the use 
of ECDH.  According to the NSA, ECDH is appropriate for 
incorporation of Suite B into many existing Internet 
protocols such as the Internet Key Exchange (IKE), 
Transport Layer Security (TLS), and Secure MIME (S/MIME). 
d. Secure Hash Algorithms 
There are currently available four secure hash 
algorithms, SHA 1, SHA 256, SHA 384, and SHA 512.  All four 
of the algorithms are iterative, one-way hash functions 
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that can process a message to produce a condensed 
representation called a message digest.  The result is that 
these algorithms can be used to verify a messages 
integrity.  Any change to the original message will result 
in a different message digest.  This capability is useful 
in the generation and verification of digital signatures 
and message authentication codes.  Every secure hash 
algorithm can be described by its two stages of 
preprocessing and hash computation. (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 2002) 
Preprocessing involves padding a message, parsing 
the padded message into m-bit blocks, and setting 
initialization values for the eventual hash computation.  
The hash computation generates a message schedule from the 
padded message and uses that schedule, along with 
functions, constants, and word operations to iteratively 
generate a series of hash values.  The final hash value 
generated by the hash computation is used to determine the 
message digest.  The four algorithms differ most 
significantly in the number of “bits of security” that are 
provided for the data being hashed, which is directly 
related to the message digest length and to the deviation 
of the algorithms output distribution (i.e., how uniformly 
likely are all possible output strings).  When a secure 
hash algorithm is used in conjunction with another 
algorithm, there may be additional requirements that 
mandate the use of a secure hash algorithm with a minimum 
number of bits of security.  For example, if a message is 
being signed with a DSA that provides 128 bits of security, 
then that signature algorithm may require the use of a  
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secure hash algorithm that also provides 128 bits of 
security (e.g., SHA-256). (U.S. Department of Commerce, 
2002) 
Finally, the four algorithms differ in terms of 
the size of the blocks and words of data that are used 
during hashing. Table 1 below lists the basic properties of 
all four secure hash algorithms. 
 
 
Table 1.   Secure Hash Algorithm Properties [From U.S. 
Department of Commerce/National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (2002)] 
C. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Message Encryption Criteria 
The majority of public key systems in use today use 
1,024-bit key parameters.  NIST has recommended that these 
1,024-bit key lengths be upgraded to something providing 
more security no later than 2010.  After that, NIST 
recommends that they be upgraded once again to something 
providing even more security.  One course of action would 
be to increase the key size up to the next level of 2048 
bits.  Another viable option is to move from first 
generation public key algorithms to elliptic curve 
algorithms. 
 30
Key bit length for a symmetric encryption algorithm is 
a common measure of security.  Table 2 gives some key sizes 
recommended by NIST to protect keys used in conventional 
encryption algorithms like the Data Encryption Standard 
(DES) and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) together 
with the equivalent key sizes for RSA, Diffie-Hellman and 
elliptic curves. 
 
Symmetric Key Size (bits) RSA and Diffie-Hellman Key Size (bits) Elliptic Curve Key Size (bits) 
80 1024 160 
112 2048 224 
128 3072 256 
192 7680 384 
256 15360 521 
Table 2.   NIST Recommended Key Size Equivalents[From 
National Security Agency Central Security Service 
(2009)] 
Consistent with CNSSP-15, Elliptic Curve Public Key 
Cryptography using the 256-bit prime modulus elliptic curve 
as specified in FIPS-186-2 and SHA-256 is appropriate for 
protecting classified information up to the SECRET level.  
Use of the 384-bit prime modulus elliptic curve and SHA-384 
are necessary for the protection of TOP SECRET information. 
In order to use RSA or Diffie-Hellman to protect 128-
bit AES keys one should use 3072-bit parameters, which are 
three times the size of those in use throughout the 
internet today.  The equivalent (strength) key size for 
elliptic curves is only 256 bits.  It rapidly becomes 
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evident that as symmetric key sizes increase, the required 
key sizes for RSA and Diffie-Hellman increase at a much 
faster rate than the required key sizes for elliptic curve 
cryptosystems in order to achieve the equivalent security 
strength.  Hence, elliptic curve systems offer more 
security per bit increase in key size than either RSA or 
Diffie-Hellman public key systems. (National Security 
Agency Central Security Service, “The Case for Elliptical 
Curves,” 2009)  
2. ECC Vulnerabilities 
In general, the best attacks on the elliptic curve 
discrete logarithm problems have been brute-force.  The 
absence of algorithm specific attacks seems to indicate 
that shorter key sizes for elliptic cryptosystems appear to 
give similar security as much larger keys that might be 
used in cryptosystems based on the discrete logarithm 
problem or integer factorization.  That stated, there are 
more efficient attacks that exist for certain choices of 
elliptic curves.  According to Menezes, Okamoto, and 
Vanstone the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem has 
been reduced to the more easily solvable traditional 
discrete logarithm problem for certain specific curves 
(Menezes, Okamoto, and Vanstone, 1990).  The implication of 
this is that the same size keys as are used in more 
traditional public key systems are now required for those 
specific elliptical curves.  However, these instances of 
vulnerability are readily classified and easily avoided and 
therefore do not pose much of a problem.   
In 1997, elliptic curve cryptography began to receive 
more attention from researchers looking to test its 
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security.  By the end of the nineties, there were no major 
improvements found to be necessary in the reliability of EC 
cryptosystems.  According to RSA Laboratories, the longer 
this situation continues, the more public confidence will 
grow that ECC really does offer as much strength as 
advertised.  However, there is some evidence that the use 
of special elliptic curves, which provide very fast 
implementations, might allow new specialized attacks.  As a 
starting point, the basic brute-force attacks can be 
improved when attacking these curves.  Continued research 
into elliptic curve cryptosystems might eventually create 
the same level of widespread trust as in other public-key 
techniques however, “the use of special purpose curves will 
most likely always be viewed with extreme skepticism.” (RSA 
Security, 1998) 
3. ECDSA Vulnerabilities 
The security objective of ECDSA is to be 
“existentially unforgeable” against a chosen message 
attack.  The goal of an adversary who launches such an 
attack against a legitimate entity is to obtain a valid 
signature on a single message, after having obtained the 
legitimate entitys signature on a collection of other 
messages of the adversarys choice. 
According to Certicoms publication on ECDSA, “Some 
progress has been made in trying to prove the security of 
ECDSA, albeit in theoretical models.  Slight variants of 
DSA and ECDSA (but not ECDSA itself) have been proven to be 
existentially unforgeable against chosen message 
attack…under the assumptions that the discrete logarithm 
problem is hard and that the hash function employed is a 
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random function.  ECDSA itself has been proven secure by 
Brown under the assumption that the underlying group is a 
generic group and that the hash function employed is 
collision resistant.”  
All possible attacks on ECDSA can be categorized into 
one of three possible classifications.  The first is 
attacks on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.  
The second is attacks on the hash function employed.  The 
third falls into the ubiquitous “other attacks” category. 
(Johnson & Menezes & Vanstone, 2001, p.28)  
4. ECDH Vulnerabilities 
A direct assault on the ECDH problem is not the only 
way an attacker might attempt to break the Diffie-Hellman 
key agreement scheme.  ECDH key agreement schemes could 
also be susceptible to small subgroup attacks (Johnson, 
1996)(Lim & Lee, 1997) in which an adversary substitutes a 
users public key with a point of small order in an attempt 
to coerce a different entity (or user) to calculate a 
predictable field element using one of the DH primitives.  
A successful attack of this type could result in the 
compromise of a session key shared by two entities, or in a 
worst-case scenario, even the compromise of one of the 
entitys secret keys.   
Two defenses recommended against this attack are 
either to validate a users public key and use the standard 
Diffie-Hellman primitive, or partially validate the entitys 
public key and use the cofactor Diffie-Hellman primitive.  
Which defense is appropriate in a given situation will 
depend on issues like whether or not interoperability with 
existing use of the standard’ Diffie-Hellman primitive is 
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desirable (the first defense interoperates while the second 
does not), and what the efficiency requirements of the 
system are (the second defense is usually more efficient). 
(Certicom Research, 2000) 
D. CURRENT STATE OF THE ART 
To date ECC adoption in the industry has been slow, 
but is gaining momentum thanks to the recent NSA 
endorsement of its advantages over RSA.  There have been a 
number of important industries and government organizations 
who are adopting ECC, but most notably eGovernment IDM 
(Identity Management) initiatives in Austria.  Austria 
began a phased implementation of Health insurance e-cards 
in May 2005 and was completely running by November of the 
same year.  Health insurance e-cards use elliptic curve 
cryptography, NIST recommended 192 bit prime field curve.  
(Austrian Profile, 2007) 
Adoption of ECC by smart card vendors has been also 
steadily increasing.  In January 2007, one of the smart 
card chipmakers, Infineon, announced that Certicom Incs 
Suite B Power Bundle will be included in the Infineon smart 
card microcontrollers, which will comply with USGs Suite B 
specifications by providing Infineon ECC-enabled smart card 
microcontrollers and Certicom software tools for the USGs 
Personal Identity Verification (PIV) cards and other 
applications. (Certicom, 2007)  Additionally, Oberthur Card 
Systems just recently received FIPS 140-2 Level 3 
certification on their 128K smart card with ECC.  
 Another major industry that is adopting ECC is the 
utility industry, where they are trying to modernize their 
meter reading and data collection system with advanced 
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metering infrastructure.  In May of 2008 Certicom launched 
a new Device Authentication Service for ZigBee Smart 
Energy.  The service uses ECC to secure wireless data 
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IV. COMPARE AND CONTRAST 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we will compare and contrast the 
performance, advantages, disadvantages, and usability of 
ECC and RSA based cryptosystems.   
B. DATA COLLECTION AND RESEARCH 
The data collection methodology used in this thesis 
includes both results from our own testing as well as from 
findings from independent research companies like Certicom 
Inc. and RSA.   
1. Empirical Data 
As the DoD prepares to move forward with CAC platform 
cryptographic migration from RSA 1024 to RSA 2048, the CAC 
Test Lab (CTL) headed by one of the authors of this thesis, 
J. Shu, and located within the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC) has performed exhaustive benchmark testing in order 
to determine the average time required to produce CAC cards 
personalized with End Entity (EE) RSA 2048 Certificates.  
CAC issuance infrastructure testing of RSA 2048 keys and 
SHA-1 signatures are part of the requirement for the 
cryptographic migration test plan.  The CTL issued a paper 
on the results of issuance testing with enlarged key sizes 
from EE RSA 1024 to EE RSA 2048 bit key length and SHA-1 
signature done from a Real-time Automated Personnel 
Identification System (RAPIDS) workstation.  These results 
are the basis for our comparative analysis of the two RSA 
key lengths. 
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2. Methods  
RAPIDS is the DoDs main form of CAC issuance.  As 
such, the DMDC CTL conducted an in-depth analysis of the 
RAPIDS logs, which were found to contain a wealth of 
information regarding key generation times.  The CTL 
approach was to look at the Application Protocol Data Unit 
(APDU) commands embedded into the RAPIDS logs and in 
conjunction with the time stamps associated with the 
commands, measure the individual specific time lapses. In 
this way, they were able come up with a quantifiable value 
associated with the establishment of each key generation.  
To compensate for the considerable size of each log the CTL 
engineers developed data pattern recognition applications, 
which were used to examine and sift through the RAPIDS 
logs.  
Pattern recognition applications work by 
systematically processing every line from a RAPIDS log.  
The CTL application used a recursive process to either 
filter out unimportant lines or to extrapolate significant 
data points from relevant lines.  In this fashion the CTL 
was able to process an entire directory worth of files, so 
that multiple RAPIDS log files could simultaneously be 
examined.  Once the information from the log files had been 
culled, the exact amount of time needed to complete each 
key generation was collected.  It is important to note that 
the CTL focused on APDU information exchange between the 
CAC and the RAPIDS station with particular regard to the 
time required to complete the communication.  The CTL did 
not include an investigation of the impact on networking; 
nor will this thesis.   
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3. Testing 
Each testing station was configured to record issuance 
times for each card issued.  In order to most effectively 
compare issuance and key generation time, a critical 
comparison of smartcard RSA ‘on card’ key generation using 
2048-bit and 1024-bit keys was conducted. 
C. RSA 1024 VS. RSA 2048 
Presently the DoD CAC performs three RSA key 
generations inside of the smart card for total security 
assurance.  After the CTL collected the RSA key generation 
data it was then able to calculate a statistical analysis 
on the timing difference between RSA 1024-bit and 2048-bit 
keys.   
1. On-Card Key Generation Analysis  
As previously stated, the algorithm for RSA key 
generation involves finding two large prime numbers from 
which key pairs are able to be generated.  Finding the two 
large prime numbers is the most time consuming step in the 
RSA key generation process.  Using a random number as a 
starting point to find the two large prime numbers they are 
then multiplied together to form the composite number.  
This composite is the key strength (e.g., 2048 bits or 1024 
bits).  The security of RSA is based on the difficulty of 
calculating the prime factors of large composite numbers. 
The time difference between 1024 and 2048 bit “on 
card” RSA key generation can be substantial due to the 
simple fact that larger numbers are much more difficult to 
factor than smaller ones.  The difference in finding 
factors of a composite number of 2048 bits as compared to a 
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composite number that is a factor of 1024 bits is non-
trivial.  In fact, although the 2048-bit key is twice the 
size of 1024-bit key, the 2048-bit key generation times 
takes about nine to ten times longer to complete.  Figure 1 
shows the average key generation time for both the RSA 2048 
and RSA 1024-bit lengths.  The average time for the 2048 
bits is approximately 48 seconds and the average time for 
the 1024 bits is approximately 5 seconds for each key 
generation.   
















Figure 1.   Average Key Generation Time 
2. RSA 2048 Key Generation  
Figure 2 shows the results of the total time it took 
to complete key generations for the 2048-bit keys.  The 
majority of the key generations took approximately 30 to 80 
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seconds to be generated.  The average key generation 



















Figure 2.   2048-Bit Key Generation Times  
Figure 3 also shows the results for the time it took 
to generate a key for the 2048 bit, however this second 
plot also includes a confidence interval showing where a 
key generation is most likely to be completed. 
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Figure 3.   2048-Bit Key Generation Times w/ CI 
Figure 4 shows the probability distribution of the 
time it took to generate a key for the 2048 bits.  It is 
most likely that key generations were completed in the 
range of approximately 30 to 75 seconds.  A key is most 
likely to be generated at approximately 48 seconds.  CTL 
uses the normal distribution or Gaussian distribution to 
describe data that clusters around a mean or average. The 
probability density function for a normal distribution is 




where μ is the mean, σ is the standard deviation (a measure 
of the “width” of the bell), and exp denotes the 
exponential function.   

















Figure 4.   2048-Bit Key Generation Probability Distribution  
3. RSA 1024 Key Generation 
Figure 5 shows the results of the total time it took 
to complete key generations for the 1024-bit keys.  The 
majority of the key generations took approximately 2 to 7 
seconds to be generated.  The average key generation 



















Figure 5.   1024-Bit Key Generation Times 
Figure 6 also shows the results for the time it took 
to generate a key for the 1024-bit keys, however the plot 
also includes a confidence interval showing where a key 
generation is most likely to be completed. 
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Figure 6.   1024-Bit Key Generation Times w/ CI 
4. Encryption/Decryption/Signing Comparison 
In an attempt to compare the two RSA key length 
metrics even further, results from recent DISA testing 
demonstrating everyday usages were studied.  The following 
figures were published at the 2009 DoD Identity Protection 
Management (IPM) Conference in Miami, Florida.    
Figure 7 plots a side-by-side comparison of RSA 1024 
and RSA 2048 digital signatures.  There are no obvious 
significant differences in the timing however, it is 
noteworthy that the time required to complete any given 
signature is non-trivial; in some cases taking longer than 
twelve seconds to sign an email with a 1 MB attachment.   
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Figure 7.   Digital Signature Comparison 
Figure 8 compares the encryption speeds for various 
scenarios involving email and corresponding applications 
that are commonly used when transmitting data.  Most 
encryption times are relatively comparable and so do not 
distinguish one key size over the other.  
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Figure 8.   RSA 1024 vs. RSA 2048 Email Encryption Timing 
Figure 9 below illustrates a similar comparison, in 
this instance focusing on the decryption times.  The reader 
will note that the decryption times are even more difficult 
to distinguish since they are similar in almost every 
scenario save the MS Office 2003 SP2 with email attachment. 
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Figure 9.   RSA 1024 vs. RSA 2048 Email Decryption Timing 
The most likely reason for the similarities in 
encryption/decryption timing for the two key lengths is the 
fact that most of the cryptographic operations are done on 
the computer (not on the smart card), which means that 
faster resources are more freely available.   
D. ECC AND RSA CRITICAL COMPARISON 
1. ECC Data 
At the time of the writing of this thesis, the authors 
did not have access to a smart card platform with ECC 
implementation.  As such, collection of performance data 
similar to on-card key generation was not possible.  The 
focus of our research was on experiments that others have 
done in comparing RSA and ECC, from which we have drawn 
conclusions.   
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a. Certicom Study 
In May of 1998 Certicom Inc., the company that 
owns most ECC related patents, published a paper on ECC 
implementations in smart cards.  Certicom Inc. has run 
benchmarks on a number of different platforms.  Table 3 
below is a sample benchmark in Solaris (167 MHz Ultra SPARC 
running Solaris 2.5.1) platforms to test the performance of 
Certicoms 163-bit ECC implementation relative to 1024-bit 
RSA implementations.  The 1024-bit RSA key pair generation 
(4.7 seconds) is significantly slower than 163 bit ECC 
(.0038 seconds).  Signing speeds are also consistently many 
times faster than those of RSA due to the fact that the 
mathematical operations used for signatures and 
encryption/decryption, are completely different.  
(Certicom, 2000)   
 
Table 3.   Solaris Sample Benchmark [From Certicom, 2000] 
b. Research In Motion (RIM) Study  
The maker of BlackBerry, Research In Motion 
(RIM), conducted a comparative analysis of RSA and ECC for 
128-bit security strength in 2004.  The similarity between 
the DoD CAC and a typical BlackBerry device is the use of a 
public key mechanism to manage the number of required keys.  
RIM chose the Simple Password Exponential Key Exchange 
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(SPEKE), which is the same as the previously discussed 
Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol, except that the hash 
of the password is used as the generator of the group.   
NIST recommends 256 bits of security for 
classified government communications.  The RIM team tested 
512-bit Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), equivalent to 
15360-bit RSA or 15360-bit Diffie-Hellman according to NIST 
Publication 800-57.  Each of these algorithms have their 
own advantages and trade-offs.  Large keys have an impact 
on the performance of power and bandwidth constrained 
devices.  RIM ran a series of tests to determine the 
performance levels of the above three algorithms for key 
generation, encryption/verification (with a public key) and 
decryption/ signature (with a private key).  
Generally, ECC had the fastest times for a 
general purpose cryptosystem.  RSA, however, is good for 
situations where only public key verification is needed.  
In the end, RIM decided to implement a hybrid solution for 
their BlackBerry device.  ECC is their preferred choice of 
cryptosystem for systems requiring a high level of 
security, key generation, or private key operations, 
however, for operations involving only public keys (e.g., 
verifying a signature), RSA is RIMs preferred choice since 
an RSA public key operation is so much faster.  RSA 
encryption is used on the BlackBerry for signature 
verification.  The timing results listed in Table 4 below 
were taken using a BlackBerry 7230 with 128-bit security.   
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Table 4.   ECC 256 vs RSA 3072 Performance Comparison  
[From Certicom, 2004] 
c. Palm Device Study 
Neil Daswani from Stanford University studied 
performance of various ECC and RSA cryptographic primitives 
on various Palm OS platforms.  Figure 10 shows interesting 
performance data on the Palm OS.  In studying the Wireless 
Transport Layer Security (WTLS) protocol, the cryptographic 
requirements of the protocol, and the time required to 
execute the required operations, Daswani found that 1024-
bit RSA based handshakes can be up to twice as fast as 163-
bit ECC based handshakes for server-authenticated WTLS 
connections, and that 163-bit ECC based handshakes are at 
least 8 times as fast as 1024-bit RSA-based handshakes for 




Figure 10.   Execution times for RSA and ECC cryptographic 
primitives [From Daswani, n.d.) 
d. Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Study  
In 2007 Beijing University of Technology 
conducted a study on ECC implementation of the Trusted 
Platform Module.  The TPM is a microcontroller that stores 
keys, passwords and digital certificates.  It typically is 
affixed to the motherboard of a PC, but could potentially 
be used in any computing device that requires these 
functions. The nature of the TPM is similar to smart cards 
in that they are both hardware based protection solutions 
and they both aim to be bandwidth and power efficient 
devices.  The TPM ensures that the information stored on it 
is made (more) secure from external software attack and 
physical theft.  Smart cards are analogous to lightweight 
versions of the TPM (without the physical theft prevention 
aspects). 
The researchers looked into the silicon gate 
count of TPM.  A silicon gate performs some logical 
operation (e.g., and, or, xor), and they are primarily 
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implemented electronically using transistors.  Researchers 
found that implementing ECC does offer improvements in 
software performance, but ECC can be particularly efficient 
in reducing hardware workload due to increased efficiency.  
As computing environments move to trusted environments and 
hardware-based implementations of security functions, the 
benefits of ECC will increase dramatically in comparison to 
RSA.  Optimized chip designs have been shown to be as much 
as 37 times faster than comparable implementations in 
software.  As technology improves, the size of chip tends 
to shrink by a factor of ten (e.g., 3,260 gates compared to 
34,000 gates as seen in Table 5). When optimized for speed, 
ECC is seven times faster when implementing current key 
lengths (1024-bit RSA at 2.6 ms vs. ECC-163 at 0.35 ms), 
and more than 80 times faster when using key lengths on the 
horizon for future security levels.  (Zhang & Zhou & Zhuang 
& Li, 2007) 
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Table 5.   ECC and RSA gate counts [From Zhang & Zhou & 
Zhuang & Li 2007] 
The Beijing Institute of Technology researchers 
concluded that elliptic curve cryptography is better suited 
to be used in TPM than the currently popular 2048-bit RSA 
because it is able to provide better performance during 
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signature and verification operations while appending less 
overhead to the certificate.  Additionally it provides gate 
counts for ECC that are significantly smaller, which means 
lower chip costs.  ECC requires fewer processor cycles, 
which allows the device to create less heat and ultimately 
less power drain.  Finally, it requires less bandwidth for 
transactions due to more efficient protocols.  
e. Sun Microsystems SSL Performance Study 
Researchers at Sun Microsystems and Dogulus 
Stebila performed a number of experiments on replacing RSA 
with ECC in secure Web transactions.  Table 6 shows that 
there is significant benefit to be gained from using ECC in 
SSL/TLS.  ECC outperformed RSA by a factor of 2.4 measuring 
operations per second (1024-bit RSA and 160-bit ECC).  
Likewise, operations per second were improved by a factor 
of 11 using 2048-bit RSA and 224-bit ECC.  Researchers used 
Apache 2.0.45 compiled with OpenSSL on a 900 MHz UltraSPARC 
111.  (Gupta & Stebila & Shantz, 2004) 
 
 
Table 6.   Secure Web transaction efficiency [From Gupta & 
Stebila & Shantz, 2004] 
E. THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES 
1. ECC Challenges 
In 1997, Certicom Inc. issued the ECC challenge in 
order to demonstrate the security of ECC.  By announcing a 
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list of elliptic curves and associated ECDLP parameters 
they set the stage, additionally offering a reward for 
solving the problem. 
For ECC over prime fields GF(p), challenges have been 
defined for the bit sizes, k = {79, 89, 97, 109, 131, 163, 
191, 239}.  Certicom provided estimates for the required 
number of machine days for solving each challenge based on 
Intel Pentium 100 processors.  The 160 bit and above, still 
requires a prodigious amount of computational power and is 
too costly to attack.  Based on previous successful 
attempts to solve the ECDLP  with smaller values for k, a 
successful attack against ECC-163 with a one year time 
limit would require 1.16X10^10 processors, which would cost 
on the order of $5.8X10^11.  These staggering numbers are 
2900 times larger than the cost of a special purpose 
hardware attack on 1024-bit length RSA.  The ultimate 
conclusion is that ECC is as secure as had been commonly 
advertised. (Gueneysu & Paar & Pelzl, 2007) 
F. KEY MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS/PERFORMANCE (MOE/MOP) 
1. Key Efficiency 
Elliptic curve cryptosystems are demonstrably more 
computationally efficient than the first generation public 
key systems currently in use.  Although elliptic curve 
arithmetic is slightly more complex per bit than either RSA 
or DH arithmetic, the added “strength per bit” would seem 
to compensate for any extra compute time.  The following 
table shows the ratio of DH computation versus EC 
computation for each of the key sizes listed in Table 2 of 
Chapter III. (National Security Agency Central Security 











Table 7.   Relative Computation Costs of Diffie-Hellman and 
Elliptic Curves [From National Security Agency Central 
Security Service, 2009] 
Until recently, the complexity of generating keys on a 
smart card was inefficient and often impractical.  With 
ECC, the time needed to generate a key pair is so short 
that even a device with the very limited computing power of 
a smart card can generate a secure key pair, provided a 
good random number generator is available.  This also means 
that the card personalization process can be streamlined 
for applications in which non-repudiation is important. 
2. Key Strength 
Cryptographic algorithms that provide security 
services are specified in the NIST 800-57 publication.  
Several of these algorithms are defined for a number of key 
sizes.  NIST provides guidance for the selection of 
appropriate algorithms with the corresponding key sizes.  
It emphasizes the importance of acquiring cryptographic 
systems with appropriate algorithm and key sizes to provide 
adequate protection for the expected lifetime of the system 
as well as any data protected by that system during the 
expected lifetime of the data. 
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a. Comparable Algorithm Strengths 
Different cryptographic algorithms provide 
different levels of strength, depending on the algorithm 
and the key size used.  Two algorithms are considered to be 
comparable for their given key sizes if the amount of work 
needed to determine the keys is approximately the same 
using a given resource.  The security of an algorithm for a 
given key size is traditionally described in terms of the 
amount of work it takes to try all keys for a symmetric 
algorithm with a key size of X that has no short-cut 
attacks.  An algorithm that has a Y-bit key, but whose 
strength is comparable to an X-bit key of a different 
symmetric algorithm is said to provide X bits of security.  
An algorithm that provides X bits of security would, on 
average, take T2(X-1) of time to attack, where T is the 
amount of time that is required to perform one encryption 
of a plaintext value and comparison of the result against 
the corresponding cipher-text value.  
Table 8 below provides comparable security 





Table 8.    Common Algorithm Strength Comparison [From NIST, 
2007] 
Column 1 indicates the number of bits of security 
provided by the algorithms and key sizes in a particular 
row.  Column 2 identifies the symmetric key algorithms that 
provide the indicated level of security.  Column 3 
indicates the minimum size of the parameters associated 
with the standards that use finite field cryptography 
(FFC).  Examples of such algorithms include DSA for digital 
signatures, and Diffie-Hellman (DH).  L is the size of the 
public key, and N is the size of the private key.  Column 4 
indicates the value for k (which corresponds to the key 
size) for algorithms based on integer factorization.  
Finally, Column 5 indicates the range of f (the size of n, 
where n is the order of the base point G) for algorithms 
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based on elliptic curves that are specified for digital 
signatures.  The value of f is commonly referred to as the 
key size. 
3. Processing Overhead 
Closely related to the key size of different public 
key systems is the channel overhead required to perform key 
exchanges and digital signatures over a network.  The key 
sizes for public keys in Table 1 of Chapter III is also 
roughly the number of bits that need to be transmitted each 
way over a communications channel for a key exchange.  
Although in the case of ECC, there is one additional bit 
that needs to be transmitted in each direction, which 
allows the recovery of both the x and y coordinates of an 
elliptic curve point. (National Security Agency Central 
Security Service, 2009) 
The difficulty of the ECDLP algorithm means that 
relatively strong security is possible with smaller key and 
certificate sizes.  The smaller key size in turn means that 
less EEPROM is required to store keys and certificates and 
that less data needs to be passed between the card and the 
application allowing for shorter transmission times. 
As smart card applications continue to require 
stronger and stronger security (via longer keys), ECC can 
continue to provide adequate security with fewer additional 
system resources.  In other words ECC smart cards are 
capable of providing higher levels of security without 
increasing their cost.  ECCs reduced processing times also 
contribute significantly to why ECC meets the smart card 
platform requirements so well.  By comparison, other public 
key systems involve so much computation that a dedicated 
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hardware device known as a crypto coprocessor is often 
required.  This crypto coprocessor not only takes up space, 
but adds about 20 to 30 percent to the cost of a chip 
(about three to five dollars towards the cost of each 
card).  With ECC, the algorithm can be implemented in 
available ROM, so no additional hardware is required to 
perform strong, fast authentication. (Certicom, 1998) 
Implementing public key cryptography in a smart card 
application poses numerous challenges.  Smart cards present 
a combination of implementation constraints that other 
platforms do not.  Constrained memory and limited computing 
power are two of them.  Current DoD CAC cards in the field 
today have between about 1K to 6K of RAM, 64 to 144 
kilobytes of EEPROM, and 16 to 32 kilobytes of ROM with the 
traditional 8 to 16 bit CPU typically clocked at Internal 
CPU clock up to 30 MHz with synchronous operation.  Any 
additional requirements of memory or processing capacity 
increase the cost to an already cost sensitive card.  Smart 
cards are also slow transmitters.  It can only communicate 
a maximum of 255 bytes per Application Protocol Data Unit 
(APDU) transaction. An APDU is the communication unit 
between a smartcard reader and a smartcard. In order to 
achieve acceptable application speeds, data elements must 
be small (to limit the amount of data passed between the 
card and the terminal).  While cryptographic services that 
are efficient in memory usage and processing power are 
needed to contain costs, reductions in transmission times 
are also needed to enhance usability.  
Given the rigid constraints on processing power, 
parameter storage, and code space, as well as slow 
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input/output associated with smart cards implementation of 
public key cryptosystems has been associated with high-end 
cards, typically with both large memory configurations and 
cryptographic coprocessors. Certicom Incs ECC 
implementations enable the deployment of lower cost smart 
cards without compromising any of the required performance 
and security features.  ECC smart cards would not require 
as much memory, nor would they require a cryptographic 
coprocessor to deliver strong authentication. 
In Summary, ECC key size advantages afford many 
benefits for smart cards, and the superior performance 
available through judicious ECC implementations make 
applications feasible in low end devices without the need 
for additional dedicated crypto hardware.  In channel-
constrained environments, elliptic curves offer a much 
better solution than first generation public key systems. 
G. CONCLUSIONS ON RSA AND ECC 
In very general terms, elliptic curve cryptosystems 
offer the same security that an RSA system or a discrete 
logarithm based system offers but with significantly 
smaller key lengths.  In terms of speed, however, it is 
quite difficult to give a quantitative comparison.  This is 
partly due to the various optimization techniques that can 
be applied to different systems.  Generally elliptic curve 
cryptosystems are faster than their corresponding discrete 
logarithm based systems.  Elliptic curve cryptosystems are 
faster than the RSA system in signing and decryption, but 
are slower in signature verification and encryption.  (RSA 
Security, 2004) 
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However, ECC implementation could have a significant 
impact on smaller devices such as PDAs or smart cards as 
the relative computational performance advantage of ECC 
over RSA is not indicated by key sizes but by the cube of 
the key sizes.  The difference becomes even more dramatic 
as the increase in RSA key sizes leads to an even greater 
increase in computational cost.  Going from 1024-bit RSA 
key to 3072-bit RSA key requires about 27 times as much 
computation while ECC would only increase the computational 
cost by just over 4 times (Vanstone, 2004).  
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V. IMPACT OF DOD MIGRATION TO NSA SUITE B 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Public key cryptography, using digital certificates, 
offers the best available technology for secure 
transmission of unclassified data across public and private 
networks.  It provides a high degree of assurance of 
confidentiality, integrity, access control, and user 
identification among users of networked applications, 
including e-mail, Web-based information transactions, and 
other electronic commerce. The DoD PKI refers to the 
framework and services that provide for the secure 
generation, production, distribution, control, and 
accounting of DoD public key certificates.  Its 
implementation was mandated by a DoD memorandum from the 
Department of Defense dated 6 May 1999, with a target 
completion date of October 2004.  
Within this framework, DoD planners have worked to 
gain and maintain the initiative in the struggle against 
those entities that would seek to benefit from breaches of 
information security.  With this in mind, the DoD and the 
U.S. Government as a whole face a paradigm shift from the 
classical discrete logarithm and integer factorization key 
generation techniques now in widespread use, to the newer, 
more creative methods of elliptic curve cryptography.   
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B. CAC ISSUANCE TIMES 
One of the primary goals of the DoD PKI is to reduce 
the amount of time required for the CAC issuance process.  
Currently with RSA 1024 the typical issuance time falls 
within a three- to five-minute window.  RSA 2048 is 
estimated to increase the time by an average of nearly two 
minutes.  If this trend is followed (e.g., RSA 3072 and 
beyond) the issue times would continue to increase and 
perhaps become unacceptable.  Here we come to one of the 
fundamental benefits of ECC over its predecessors.  
As was shown in Chapter IV, CAC issuance using ECC 
will provide a significant reduction in processing time.  
According to the information contained in Table 3, 163-bit 
ECC takes 3.8 milliseconds to generate a key.  From the RIM 
performance comparison in Table 4/ we see also that 256-bit 
ECC takes only 166 milliseconds.  It is difficult to say 
with accuracy how long key generation will take using the 
limited resources on a CAC card, because RIMs BlackBerry is 
a faster, more capable platform compared to a typical 
smartcard chip, and because 163-bit ECC is not the size 
recommended by NIST.  Regardless, it is clear that even 
without knowing the exact key generation time required for 
ECC, the general difference, which is an order of magnitude 
improvement, is significant.   
From the CAC test lab studies at the DMDC mentioned in 
Chapter IV, we know RSA 2048 key generation times will be 
approximately 45 seconds per key.  Multiply this number by 
three, which is the number of keys generated on a CAC (ID 
Certificate, PIV Authority Certificate, and Signature 
Certificate) and the reader will have a general idea of  
how much time each CAC requires. 
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Time savings will translate to higher productivity.  
The ability to produce more in less time will lead to 
customer satisfaction and ultimately lower costs.  Consider 
the scenario where a large number of new CAC holders need 
to receive their cards — new contractors for example.  A 
substantially smaller amount of time will be necessary to 
complete the CAC issuance process for each new individual.  
C. EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE 
1. Current DoD PKI Architecture 
According to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
(DEPSECDEF) memorandum entitled “Department of Defense 
Public Key Infrastructure,” as modified by the DoD Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) on 12 August 2000, there were at 
least twelve top-level milestones for the DoD PKI.  The 
milestones included practical items like certificate 
issuance and registration infrastructure deployment.  They 
also contained mission essential tasks like functional 
token certificate based access control and ensuring the 
ability to appropriately sign emails. 
The time allocated to complete the year 2000 
milestones was approximately four years.  The authors of 
this thesis anticipate that the transition to NSA Suite B 
will be equally as comprehensive, but that the time 
required to fully integrate will not be as long as the 
original transition to PKI systems.  This transition is 
expected to be difficult due mostly to factors of 
interoperability, which will be addressed to some degree by 
the modular architecture of the DoD PKI. (Information 
Assurance Technology Analysis Center, 2000) 
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The DoD PKI, which evolved from the DoD Medium 
Assurance Pilot PKI, supports the protection of business 
transactions and sensitive but unclassified administrative 
information.  The DoD PKI can also be used on closed 
networks like SIPRNET or NIPRNET to provide additional 
protection such as user authentication and data separation. 
(Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center, 2000)  
DoD PKI service employs a hierarchical architecture 
consisting of a centralized Root CA with a single level of 
subordinate CAs, a small number of Registration Authorities 
(RA), and a larger number of Local Registration Authorities 
(LRA).  Currently LRAs function at RAPIDS stations, and 
certificates are able to be installed on DoD CACs. 
(Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center, 2000) 
Given this existing infrastructure, a great deal of 
planning is necessary in order to implement a new 
cryptographic suite.  
2. DoD PKI Hardware and Software 
The DoD PKI PMO procures all hardware required for PKI 
implementation at the Root and CA levels.  At the lower 
levels the various services or governmental agencies are 
responsible for acquiring, installing, accrediting, 
operating, and maintaining components associated with PKI. 
(Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center, 2000)   
Currently, the DMDC has deployed integrated RAPIDS 
workstations at approximately 2,000 DoD RAPIDS stations at 
various locations around the world.  These integrated 
RAPIDS workstations were meant to support the issuance of  
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the four certificates (only three of which are generated 
inside the DoD CAC) to all military, civilian, and selected 
contractor personnel.   
Each RAPIDS station is manned with a Verification 
Officer (VO).  All of these VOs will require updated 
training, as well as replacement CACs with updated ECC 
standards.  CAC replacement is necessary because in order 
to issue ECC certificates the issuer must possess a 
sufficient security level.  Additionally, all 2,000 
workstations will need to be updated to support ECC.  This 
process will be exacerbated by the fact that the stations 
are deployed around the globe. 
a. Implementation at the Local Commands 
Where applications employing public key 
technology are required, the local commands and DoD 
organizational elements are responsible for developing and 
deploying public key enabled applications (or integrating 
commercially available PK enabled products) that are 
compatible and compliant with the DoD PKI.  In accordance 
with DEPSECDEF memorandum dated 12 August 2000, all the 
former PK enabled applications have been transitioned so 
that they are DoD PKI compliant.  Additionally, all Web 
servers have been PK enabled to perform server-side 
authentication using SSL Authentication and DoD public key 
certificates.  Currently, the vast majority of DoD Web 
servers are capable of performing client-side 
authentication using DoD CAC certificates. (DoD Public Key 
Infrastructure Program Management Office, 2000) 
To date, all active duty military personnel, 
members of the Selected Reserve, DoD civilian employees, 
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and eligible contractor personnel who require access to DoD 
systems have received their PKI certificates on a DoD CAC 
(over 10 million since 2002).  Although DMDC installed the 
upgraded integrated RAPIDS workstation at its RAPIDS 
locations, the responsibility for issuing DoD CACs remains 
with the DoD organizations operating the RAPIDS stations.  
For most services, the DoD RAPIDS stations are typically 
located at local Personnel Support Detachment (PSD), Pass & 
ID, or Security offices.  Individual departments were left 
with the responsibility to develop specific plans and 
identify any additional resources needed to support 
certificate and CAC issuance. (DoD Public Key 
Infrastructure Program Management Office, 2000)  
Here the impact of implementation of NSA Suite B 
is that the local commands will now be responsible for 
integration within their current command specific CAC 
enabled applications.  This will be costly in terms of re-
design, testing, development and integration.  If the new 
methods do not work a hybrid solution will have to be 
looked at which will be discussed at length in Chapter VI.  
All of this will lead to potentially significant costs in 
time and money.  
b. DoD Certification Authority 
The agency responsible for all aspects of the DoD 
PKI is the DoD PKI Program Management Office (PMO).  DoD 
PKI PMO coordinates all component and system development 
and testing through the efforts of its three working 
groups.  The DoD PKI Technical Working Group is responsible 
for identifying, addressing, and resolving technical and 
operational issues associated with the implementation and 
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operation of the DoD PKI.  The DoD PKI Business Working 
Group is responsible for addressing DoD PKI business 
requirements.  The DoD PKI Certificate Policy Management 
Working Group (CPMWG) is responsible for preparing and 
coordinating the DoD Certificate Policy (CP), including the 
creation, review, and update of all relevant documentation. 
The NSA, supported by DISA, serves as the DoD PKI 
PMO as directed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
C4I, and provides coordination of activities across the DoD 
to define and implement the DoD PKI.  The PMO provides the 
leadership and coordination for all PKI activities across 
the Department, and is the single point of responsibility 
for all DoD PKI planning, development, and implementation 
activities.  The DoD PKI PMO is responsible for overall 
program management of all DoD efforts required to execute 
the DoD PKI transition.  The PMO is also responsible for 
raising awareness of the status of ongoing and planned PKI 
related activities, and the support that is available for 
their effective use. (DoD Public Key Infrastructure Program 
Management Office, 2000) 
The impact of migration at this level will be the 
scope of the broad planning efforts required.  NSA will 
need to continue to liaison with DISA, and DISA will have 
to maintain communications with the DMDC in order to 
receive and deliver guidance and progress reports.  In 
addition to the large scale coordination efforts required, 
the monetary costs associated with renewed licensing, third 
party consulting fees and the myriad other miscellaneous 
expenses that will arise will have an impact. 
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D. MIGRATION COSTS 
 In order to stay relevant the DoD PKI structure must 
continually evolve over time, and the PKI Program has 
established a fundamental philosophy for these transitions.  
Enhanced system capabilities must be introduced in parallel 
with existing operational capabilities.  Every effort will 
have to be made to ease the operational impact to 
subscribers resulting from the evolution of infrastructure 
capabilities.  Whenever feasible, the transition strategy 
should not be based on hard cutovers.  This will allow 
subscribers to plan and implement effective transitions of 
their operations to take advantage of the newest 
capabilities. 
 The DoD PKI has adopted a highly modular, nodal 
architecture for the evolving DoD key management 
infrastructure.  The architecture is built on four types of 
nodes.  The first is the Client Node, which represents the 
subscribers that require products and services from the 
PKI.  The next node is the Primary Services Node (PRSN).  
The PRSN is the core element of the PKI structure, 
providing common management functions in a server-based 
architecture.  It offers client nodes access to the 
production sources, providing direct delivery of PKI 
products and services to applications that require them.  
It also handles subscriber access control and manages the 
interfaces between the other nodes.  The third node is the 
Production Source Nodes (PSNs), which interfaces to the 
common management functions of the PRSN (e.g., the PKI CA 
that provides certificate management functions such as 
certificate creation, posting, rekeying, and revocation).  
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Finally, the Central Services Node (CSN) provides overall 
system management and configuration management functions 
for the infrastructure, including the long-term system 
archive and the master key management infrastructure 
database.  The CSN also handles system health monitoring 
and overall infrastructure security management, including 
intrusion detection security oversight and audit data and 
analysis. (DoD Public Key Infrastructure Program Management 
Office, 2000)   
 By enforcing modularity while maintaining control of 
both physical and functional interfaces, PKI features and 
capabilities are theoretically set up to evolve over time 
in a structured and cost effective manner, which will 
facilitate an eventual cutover to Suite B. 
1. DoD PKI 5.0 
As indicated earlier, the DoD PKI evolution is 
designed to offer PKI products and services with a 
transition transparent to subscribers.  The detailed design 
and planning for this evolution is extensive, but the 
evolutionary strategy is fairly straightforward.   
The Medium Assurance PKI pilot was transitioned to the 
Class 3 PKI (Release 1.0) in April 1998.  In July 2000, the 
DoD Class 3 PKI (Release 2.0), which introduced the use of 
newer certificates was approved for operational use.  
Efforts to incorporate PKI LRA functionality into RAPIDS 
terminals were completed.  These updated RAPIDS terminals 
were introduced in Class 3 PKI Release 3.0 to provide a 
means for registering users enrolled in DEERS into the PKI 
and issuing CACs (smart cards) that serve as PKI hardware 
tokens.  The Class 3 PKI Release 3.0 will also continue to 
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support certificates in software.  PKI Release 4.0 provides 
an initial set of Class 4 (Defense Messaging System or DMS) 
PKI products and services consistent with those provided by 
the existing Class 3 PKI. (DoD Public Key Infrastructure 
Program Management Office, 2000) 
The basic definition for DoD PKI Release 5.0 includes 
support for access control mechanisms that enables the 
transition of DMS organizational messaging subscribers to 
the DoD PKI.  It will introduce an initial set of trusted 
date and trusted time stamp services.  It will provide an 
initial capability for integrity/software download 
certificates.  It will allow additional support for new Key 
Exchange and DSA algorithms (like ECC).  Finally, it will 
provide toolkits for PKI-aware applications. (DoD Public 
Key Infrastructure Program Management Office, 2000) 
a. Infrastructure Management 
DoD PKI Release 5.0 will provide regional 
deployments of PKI Primary Service Nodes.  It will allow 
for the ability to create new roles and dynamic mapping of 
privileges to those roles.  It will create enhance existing 
PKI Help Desk features including an expanded repository of 
PKI information with on-line access available to authorized 
users.  Its external interoperability will be expanded to 
approved Allied and Coalition partner PKIs.  It will 
integrate Class 3 and 4 PRSN structures.  Finally, it will 
incorporate an independent CSN with electronic access to 
all PRSNs. (DoD Public Key Infrastructure Program 
Management Office, 2000) 
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b. Anticipatory Developments 
There are a number of additional PKI related 
activities that are substantial in order to accomplish the 
5.0 Release.  These activities are intended to ensure the 
smooth progression of PKI capabilities.  Among them is the 
development of an audit reduction tool, implementation of 
the EC algorithm, and the development of a key management 
Applications Programming Interface (API).  Additionally, 
time stamp application and processing, and prototype 
automated accounting and archive capabilities.  Release 5.0 
will also be used to enhance the tactical aspects of DoD 
PKI to include a tactical network model, protocol 
simulators and demand simulators.  Release 5.0 will also 
act as an integration tool to ease into the Release 6.0 
transition by merging a prototype deployable PRSN and a PSN 
simulator for new algorithms as well as prototype Class 5 
PKI PRSN and PSN capabilities.  As always, these 
prototyping activities are subject to the availability of 
funds and are subject to the priorities that are 
established at the time of their initiation. (DoD Public 
Key Infrastructure Program Management Office, 2000) 
2. Money 
a. Hardware Replacement 
Most of the core infrastructure components 
associated with the PKI (i.e., RAs, directory components 
and LRAs) are already in place within the DoD.  Currently 
LRA functional capability at the DoD RAPIDS stations is 
nominal.  The oversight of the operation of LRAs, and 
issuance of CACs and Smart Card readers, via DEERS/RAPIDS 
is also already in place.  Finally, additional LRAs beyond 
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those provided by DoD RAPIDS stations have been established 
and can provide RA/LRA operations, maintenance, and life 
cycle support (Information Assurance Technology Analysis 
Center, 2000).   
The implementation of ECC itself will not require 
any significant hardware updates.  Currently planned 
hardware refreshment plans will be sufficient and should 
remain unaffected by the migration.  The only real hardware 
that will have to be replaced across the board is the 
actual cards that are issued to DoD personnel but even that 
will occur within the normal replacement cycles, which will 
be facilitated by the phased transition approach.   
b. Infrastructure Upgrade 
The PKI PMO has the task of identifying toolkits 
and ensuring they are available to facilitate the 
interaction and customer support for programs and vendors 
that are actually performing PKI transitions.  DISA will 
lead activities to identify and evaluate the effectiveness 
of commercial PKI toolkits.  NSA will take the lead for 
developing specialized toolkits needed to address specific 
requirements that cannot be satisfied from the private 
sector.  DISA Joint Integration and Testing Command (JITC) 
has been established as a PK enabled applications test 
facility for developers and integrators to verify 
compliance and compatibility of their implementations 
within the PKI.  All DoD services and agencies will retain 
the responsibility for enabling their applications and 




including the funding needed to maintain and operate the 
test facilities. (NIST Information Technology Laboratory, 
2000) 
The DMDC is responsible for the development and 
upgrade of RAPIDS terminals to incorporate the 
functionality and establish operations needed for them to 
serve as LRAs for the PKI.  The DMDC would perform the 
RAPIDS development activities. 
c. Refresh Plan 
The PKI PMO will assume overall responsibility 
for procuring, or directing the procurement of all 
centrally operated infrastructure elements.  The PKI PMO 
will develop the acquisition strategy for any significant 
changes to the DoD PKI.  Concurrently, NSA and DISA will 
procure, develop, or direct the procurement of the 
centrally operated infrastructure elements of the key 
management infrastructure.  DISA will also be responsible 
for the procurement and deployment of centralized directory 
elements of the PKI.  The DoD PKI PMO will develop the 
acquisition strategy for the DoD PKI, the certificate 
management components and services as well as the refresh 
plan.  DISA is the lead for the integration of the 
centralized components of the PKI, including the CA servers 
and directory components.  The services and agencies will 
procure local infrastructure elements, PKI RA and LRA 
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VI. MANAGING RISK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Assuming DoD will eventually wholly migrate to Suite 
B, risk management will play a large role in the successful 
transition.  The purpose of this chapter is to identify 
risk and then make some educated recommendations on how to 
best mitigate those risks. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
Within this chapter, we intend to review the RSA 1024 
to RSA 2048 Migration Plan.  From this plan, we will 
evaluate the lessons learned.  This information will then 
be factored into the creation of an original critical path 
analysis for the RSA to ECC transition. 
Also within this chapter, we will identify some of the 
other potentially high risk areas associated with 
development, deployment and operation of NSA Suite B within 
the DoD framework.  Recognizing that effective risk 
management is critical to the success of any program, we 
break it down into its two fundamental parts; assessment 
and mitigation.  
C. NSA SUITE B MIGRATION RISKS 
1. Proprietary Complications 
As a way of clearing the way for the implementation of 
elliptic curves to protect US and allied government 
information, the National Security Agency purchased a 
license from Certicom Inc. that covers all of their 
intellectual property in a restricted field of use.  The 
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license would be limited to implementations that were for 
national security uses and certified under FIPS 140-2 or 
were approved by NSA.  Further, the license would be 
limited to only prime field curves where the prime was 
greater than 2255.  On the NIST list of curves 3 out of the 
15 fit this field of use: the prime field curves with 
primes of 256 bits, 384 bits and 521 bits.  Certicom Inc. 
identified 26 patents that covered this field of use.  NSAs 
license includes a right to sublicense these 26 patents to 
vendors building products within the restricted field of 
use.  Certicom Inc. also retained a right to license 
vendors both within the field of use and under other terms 
that they may negotiate with vendors. (Certicom, 2000) 
a. Local Level Challenges 
As previously alluded to in Chapter V, local 
commands will be responsible for their command specific CAC 
enabled applications.  This will present some unique 
challenges due to the newness of the technology.  Local 
Commands will face application upgrade issues in terms of 
hiring subject matter experts who will be necessary to 
facilitate the software upgrades.  Moreover, they may have 
to deal with the patent issues associated with Certicoms 
commercial ownership of ECC.   
2. Software Compatibility 
Less than a year prior to the publication of this 
thesis, Windows announced that its Vista Service Pack 1 and 
Windows Server 2008 would support Suite B cryptographic 
algorithms as a part of its Cryptography Next Generation 
(CNG).  For Windows 7.0 and Server 2008 R2, TLS and 
 79
Encrypting File System (EFS) will be implemented using 
Suite B algorithms.  Currently CNG is not FIPS 140-2 level 
2 certified, nor is it Common Criteria certified, which 
prohibits its use within the DoD.  FIPS 140-2 precludes the 
use of un-validated cryptography for cryptographic 
protection of sensitive data within the federal system.  
Invalidated cryptography is viewed by NIST as providing no 
protection to the information or data – in effect the data 
would be considered unprotected plaintext.  If the agency 
specified that information or data be cryptographically 
protected, then FIPS 140-2 is applicable, and if 
cryptography is required, it must be validated. (NIST 
Information Technology Laboratory, 2009) 
With the passage of the Federal Information Security 
Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, there is no longer a 
statutory provision to allow agencies to waive mandatory 
FIPS.  The waiver provision had been included in the 
Computer Security Act of 1987; however, FISMA superseded 
that act.  
Although the latest versions of Windows applications 
are in the process of incorporating Suite B for use within 
the DoD, earlier versions will not be retroactively 
upgraded.  For example, Windows XP and Server 2003 will not 
be supported and will eventually have to be phased out of 
use as Suite B incrementally supplants older methods. 
3. RSA Critical Path Analysis 
We will be using the Critical Path Method (CPM) or 
Critical Path Analysis to analyze former DoD migration 
projects to provide perspective on the migration to Suite 
B.  We will also create Network Planning Diagrams, which 
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are very effective planning tools for unique projects that 
contain interactions between several components with many 
interrelated tasks.  CPM is also an effective procedure for 
using network analysis to identify those tasks on the 
critical path, which have the potential to lengthen the 
overall project timescale.  For most deviations from the 
critical path (late starts, early starts, etc.) there is a 
degree of tolerance within which project success is still 
likely.  
a. RSA 1024 to RSA 2048 Lessons Learned 
The major tasks that must be completed on time 
for the migration of RSA 1024 to RSA 2048 are outlined in 
Table 9 below. 




1. Develop Migration Process for Software  1 
2. CAC Enable Application Testing   21 
3. CA Upgraded  38 
4. Sample Alpha Cards Received  27 
5. Go Through FIPS Certification   
6. Update CAC Infrastructure Software  1 17 
7. Server Test Upgrade 1 21 
8. RAPIDS Upgrade 1 20 
9. Applet/Card Integration Test 4 2 
10. Infrastructure software Install / 
Patch update 
6 20 
11. CAC Enable Application Test 8 6 
12. Provide Server Certificates 3 1 
13. Test CA 3 5 
14. CAC Infrastructure Integration Test 10 1 
15. Deploy New Server 15 2 
16.  Install Server Certs 12 2 
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17. Alpha Card Internal Testing 9 11 
18. Alpha Card Customer Testing 17, 12 4 
19. CAC Infrastructure Deploy to Test 
Environment  
14 1 
20. CAC Issuance Integration Test  15, 11, 16, 
19 
2 
21.  Order Beta Cards 9 13 
22. Performed new Card Keys Ceremony 21 2 
23.  Issue Beta Card 20, 13, 22 1 
24.  Beta Card Testing 23 9 
25.  Approve for Production 24, 5 1 
Table 9.   Critical Tasks for RSA 1024 to RSA 2048 
From this table a network activity diagram was 
created that shows the dependent sequence of activities.  
In the diagram, a network of tasks is set up to show which 
need completion before other tasks can be started.  This 
helps to identify the critical path, which is the route 
through the network that will take the most time.  If there 
are more than one predecessor tasks, then there will be 
several possible early starts.  The largest of these is the 
most important.  The early finish for each task is equal to 
the early start plus the task duration.  The final 
calculation is for the earliest completion time for the 
project.  This is calculated like the early start date.  
Starting with the tasks at the end of the diagram, 
calculate the late start and late finish for each task in 
turn, following the arrows in the reverse direction, as in 
Figure 11 below. 
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Figure 11.   RSA 1024 to RSA 2048 Critical Path 
The late finish is the same as the late start of 
the succeeding task (for the final tasks in the project, 
this is equal to the earliest completion date). If there is 
more than one successor task, then there are several 
possible late tasks. We select the smallest of these.  The 
late start for each task is the late finish minus the task 
duration.  The final calculation is for the earliest 
completion time for the project.  This is calculated in the 
same way as the early start date.  We calculate slack time 
by subtracting the early start from the late start.  The 
slack time is the amount of time the task can be slipped 
without affecting the end date.  Tasks on the critical path 





















1. Develop Migration 
Process for 
Software  
 1 0 1 2 3 2 
2. CAC Enable 
Application 
Testing  
 21 0 21 15 36 15 
3. CA Upgraded  38 0 38 1 39 1 
4. Sample Alpha Cards 
Received 
 27 0 27 0 27 0 
5. Go Through FIPS 
Certification 
 39 0 39 15 54 15 
6. Update CAC 
Infrastructure 
Software  
1 17 1 18 3 20 2 
7. Server Test 
Upgrade 
1 21 1 22 19 40 18 
8. RAPIDS Upgrade 1 20 5 25 16 36 11 
9. Applet/Card 
Integration Test 
4 2 27 29 27 29 0 
10. Infrastructure 
software Install / 
Patch update 
6 20 18 38 20 40 2 
11. CAC Enable 
Application Test 
8 6 25 31 36 42 11 
12. Provide Server 
Certificates 
3 1 38 39 39 40 1 
13. Test CA 3 5 38 43 39 44 1 
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14. CAC Infrastructure 
Integration Test 
10 1 38 39 40 41 2 
15. Deploy New Server 15 2 22 24 40 42 34 
16.  Install Server 
Certs 
12 2 39 41 40 42 1 
17. Alpha Card 
Internal Testing 
9 11 29 40 30 41 1 
18. Alpha Card 
Customer Testing 
17, 12 4 40 44 41 45 1 
19. CAC Infrastructure 
Deploy to Test 
Environment  
14 1 39 40 41 42 2 
20. CAC Issuance 
Integration Test  
15, 11, 16, 
19 
2 41 43 42 44 1 
21.  Order Beta Cards 9 13 29 42 29 42 0 
22. Performed new Card 
Keys Ceremony 
21 2 42 44 42 44 0 
23.  Issue Beta Card 20, 13, 22 1 44 45 44 45 0 
24.  Beta Card Testing 23 9 45 54 45 54 0 
25.  Approve for 
Production 
24, 5 1 54 55 54 55 0 
Table 10.   Critical Tasks for RSA to ECC 
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4. ECC Critical Path Risk Analysis 
Based on the nature of the risks identified earlier, 
an estimate of the duration of each activity associated 
with Suite B migration is possible.  The activities were 
each given three time estimates.  In so doing, uncertainty 
in completion time is accounted for to an acceptable 
degree.  This is accomplished by using the following 
formula: 
   te=((t0+4(tm)+tp))/6 
Optimistic Time (t0) is the time in which any 
particular activity may be completed if everything goes 
well and there are no complications.  Most Likely Time (tm) 
is the time in which a particular activity can most often 
be completed under normal conditions.  If an activity is 
repeated many times, the duration of time to accomplish 
this activity that occurs most often would be equivalent to 
the most likely time estimate.  Pessimistic time (tp) is 
the time in which a particular activity may be completed 
under adverse conditions, such as having unusual and 
unforeseen complications. (Gido, 1985) 
It may be possible to reduce the critical path of a 
project (and consequently pull in the completion date) by 
rearranging some tasks, which have an optional sequence or 
by moving key personnel into tasks in the critical path. 
Our prediction for the migration from RSA to ECC is 
that the lack of applications that are ready for Suite B 
implementation and the lack of completed field testing will 
be a major factor in the prolonging of the completion of 
Suite B migration. 
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Figure 12 and Table 11 below illustrate the related 
critical path and essential tasks. 
 
 




Name  Description  
Duration 
(Weeks) 





















Testing  21 30.17 21 30 40 0 30 15 36 15 
3. CA Upgraded 38 38.00 36 37 44 0 38 9 47 9 
4. 
Sample Alpha 












Upgrade 21 21.17 19 21 24 1 22 27 48 26 
8. 
RAPIDS 
Upgrade 20 20.17 18 20 23 5 25 10 30 5 
9. 
Applet/Card 
Integration Test 2 2.33 2 2 4 27 29 28 30 1 
10. 
Infrastructure 
software Install / 
Patch update 20 20.00 19 20 21 18 38 28 48 10 
11. 
CAC Enable 
Application Test 6 20.00 15 20 25 30 50 30 50 0 
12. 
Provide Server 
Certificates 1 1.17 1 1 2 38 39 47 48 9 




Integration Test 1 1.17 1 1 2 38 39 48 49 10 
15. 
Deploy New 
Signing Server 2 2.17 2 2 3 22 24 48 50 26 
16. 
Install Server 
Certs 2 3.00 2 3 4 39 42 39 42 0 
17. 
Alpha Card 








Deploy to Test 
Environment  1 2.00 1 2 3 39 41 49 50 10 
20. 
CAC Issuance 
Integration Test  2 5.00 4 5 6 50 55 50 55 0 
21. 
Order Beta 




Ceremony 2 2.33 2 2 4 42 44 53 44 11 
23. Issue Beta Card 1 2.00 1 2 3 55 57 55 57 0 
24. 
Beta Card 
Testing 9 20.00 9 19 35 57 77 57 77 0 
25. 
Approve for 
Production 1 1.33 1 1 3 77 78 77 78 0 
Table 11.   RSA to ECC Critical Tasks  
D. RISK MITIGATION 
1. Incremental Implementation 
Much of the required infrastructure that supports 
everyday applications within DoD (e.g., Kerberos, Smart 
Card logon, S/MIME) is not fully Suite B supported.  To 
date one of the few major protocols that are fully 
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supported is TLS/SSL (Microsoft, 2009).  That being the 
case, TLS is an ideal place to start the incremental 
transition.   
According to Bob Lord, Senior Engineering Director at 
Redhat TLS is primed for initial migration activities 
because it provides the fewest unpredictable variables.  
Specifically, servers are under the direct control of their 
owners.  Additionally some newer browsers are already ECC 
enabled.  By comparison, clients are more widespread and 
have many more varieties of requirements and policy 
constraints, which make them unlikely candidates to be a 
starting point. (Lord, 2009) 
2. Software Upgrade Cycles 
As a best practice for maintaining the highest levels 
of security, it is recommended that the latest version of a 
given browser (e.g. Internet Explorer, Firefox) is used for 
all Web-based applications. 
3. Pilot Programs 
When top-level changes are implemented — like the 
cryptographic migration of RSA to ECC — it is always 
prudent to start with a relatively small, controlled 
environment in which to test the new technology so that 
there is less risk of unforeseen consequences.   
The lessons learned from pilot programs can be 
invaluable.  Mistakes that occur on a relatively small 
scale can prevent system wide failures that would have more 
severe consequences. 
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The authors of this thesis highly recommend an ECC 
pilot program similar to the Medium Assurance Pilot program 
that led to the eventual implementation of DoD PKI.  
4. Resource/Funding Allocation 
Funding availability is always a potential risk when 
dealing with major government programs.  Much of the 
responsibility for ensuring that PKI related programs 
receive their funding will fall to the PKI PMO.  The PMO 
must coordinate with the various agencies (NSA, DISA, etc.) 
and services (USA, USMC, USN, USAF, etc.) involved to 
identify resources needed to complete the development of 
the architecture, perform security analysis and testing as 
well as procurement.  It must also coordinate to identify 
funding and resources needed to deploy and operate the 
local infrastructure elements.  All of these tasks will go 
towards ensuring that funding is effectively allocated for 
specific PKI related activities like migration to NSA Suite 
B. 
5. Near Term Migration Path 
a. Legacy Systems 
Some legacy systems will not be able to make the 
move to ECC due mostly to the fact that there are too many 
deployed clients.  This issue of deployment will prevent a 
quick upgrade to ECC.  Many clients are not under direct 
control because they fall under the local command 
authority.  When local priorities, logistics, budgets, 
schedules and overall lack of resources are considered, 
complete upgrades will often become easy targets for 
commanders looking to balance multiple needs.  For example, 
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The U.S. Navys fleet used Windows NT long after the rest of 
the DoD had transitioned to Windows 2000/XP because 
widespread compatibility issues on sensitive systems.  A 
similar decision now would have significant implications as 
the DoD transitions to NSA Suite B.   
b. Solutions 
DoD users will more than likely operate within a 
hybrid of ECC and RSA for the near term and into the 
foreseeable future.  The modular nature of the PKI 
infrastructure as well as the phased implementation 
approach will drive this hybrid solution as much as the 
fact that schedules are almost certain to be extended to 
accommodate delays.  Among the implications of this hybrid 
approach are the need for servers that can support both ECC 
and RSA.   
Web servers like Fortitude (Netscape replacement) 
support both ECC and RSA on one platform.  In this fashion, 
new ECC enabled clients can still talk to old RSA-only 
clients via use of the same server.  Moreover, this will 
enable a smooth transition well in advance of any final 




Public key cryptography has become a mainstay for 
secure communications over the Internet and throughout many 
other forms of communication.  It provides the foundation 
for key management and digital signatures.  With key 
management, it is used to distribute the secret keys used 
in other cryptographic algorithms.  Regarding digital 
signatures, it is used to authenticate the origin of data 
and protect the integrity of that data.  It is paramount to 
the security of the United States of America that the 
information deemed too sensitive to be viewed by 
antagonistic entities remains secure.  It is from this 
point of view that the magnitude of the implications of a 
failed transition to new cryptographic techniques is fully 
realized.   
B. FINDINGS 
The Authors of this thesis have attempted to determine 
some of the potential impacts of the DoD migration to NSA 
Suite B on CAC usage, issuance and performance.  Testing 
was divided into two parts.  The first was a comparison of 
1024- and 2048-bit RSA key generation and Secure Sockets 
Layer (SSL) authentication, including detailed statistical 
information on the difference between the 1024-bit keys and 
the 2048-bit keys.  We found a significant delta in key 
generation times from RSA 1024 to RSA 2048 although there 
was little noticeable difference when comparing encryption 
and decryption times and digital signature generation 
times.   
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That said, if the DoD continues its present course of 
action of further increasing RSA key lengths, the next 
iteration will be 3072 bits.  A key length of that size 
would be unsustainable in terms of smart card issuance for 
the DoD, given that 2048-bit keys are already taking nearly 
two minutes longer to generate per user than RSA 1024.  As 
noted in Chapter IV, the relative computational performance 
advantages of ECC over RSA are compelling.  Prominent 
telecommunications company, Research In Motion, has also 
stated publicly that the key pair generation for RSA 3072 
is “too long” even for their platforms, which have greater 
computing resources than a smart card.  
Additionally, based on findings obtained through DMDC 
lab testing of CAC cards using different RSA key lengths as 
well as independent private sector testing of ECC, we 
assessed that Elliptic Curve Cryptography will provide 
comparable security with more efficient performance than 
the first generation public key techniques currently in 
use.  From this, the authors have determined that an 
attractive course of action is to implement the ECC 
alternative. 
The authors identified and attempted to mitigate some 
of the risks associated with a DoD-wide migration to NSA 
Suite B.  We identified the following areas as potentially 
highly risky: intellectual property, software 
compatibility, local level challenges, resources, funding, 
and scheduling.  Unless these major risks are attended to, 
the Suite B migration project will be in jeopardy. 
Risk mitigation notwithstanding, it will be a long 
while before the U.S. Government will be able to completely 
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transition to a new cryptographic suite of algorithms.  An 
RSA-ECC hybrid solution is more likely as the PKI 
infrastructure slowly adapts to its changing cryptographic 
environment.  In fact, the phased implementation mentality 
that has so far defined the implementation of PKI since its 
inception in the late 1990s will almost certainly demand a 
parallel solution that features both the old and the new 
for quite some time.   
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As was alluded to in Chapter IV, Smart cards that are 
enabled with ECC implementation are not currently 
available.  When they are, more complete testing will be 
possible.  This testing should include taking a measure of 
on-card performance of ECC.  Additionally, more 
comprehensive testing of end-to-end ECC performance across 
DoD networks would be beneficial. 
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